Speaker Profile
Dr. CHEN Jing is currently the William A. Black Business Chair Professor in the Department of Management Science and Information Systems at the Rowe School of Business, Dalhousie University (Canada). She earned her PhD in Management Science from the Richard Ivey School of Business at Western University (Canada). Her research interests include competitive channel and supply chain management, the intersection of operations management and marketing, and service return issues. She has published over 100 papers in leading journals, including Production and Operations Management (POM), Decision Sciences (DS), The International Journal of Management Science (OMEGA), Naval Research Logistics (NRL), IISE Transactions, and Transportation Research Part E (TRE).
Currently, she serves as an Associate Editor for The International Journal of Management Science (OMEGA), The Journal of the Operational Research Society (JORS), IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management (TEM), and International Transactions in Operational Research (ITOR). Additionally, she has developed more than 20 cases for the Ivey Business School.
Abstract
This study investigates how a manufacturer’s production economies of scale influence its incentive to encroach on the retail market and the subsequent effects on the retailer, under two organizational structures: centralized and decentralized. Manufacturer encroachment can expand sales and lower average production costs due to economies of scale. Under a centralized structure, the manufacturer retains decision-making authority over the direct selling business, while under a decentralized structure, this authority is delegated to its division. Our analysis shows that under no manufacturer’s profit encroachment with a decentralized structure, stronger economies of scale consistently improve the encroachment or under without harming the retailer in contrast to a centralized structure, leading to cannibalization that reduces profits as both parties more efficient retail channel, the less efficient direct channel. Stronger economies of scale can rebalance, as sales shift from the. Furthermore, the profitability of encroachment is asymmetric across structures: the manufacturer may be worse off under a centralized structure when economies of scale are strong, and worse off under a decentralized structure when economies of scale are weak. From the retailer’s perspective, stronger economies of scale always worsen the profit under a centralized structure but increase the likelihood of benefiting from encroachment under a decentralized one. Finally, when the manufacturer is free to choose its internal organizational structure, it prefers a centralized structure if economies of scale are weak or the direct selling cost is sufficiently low, and a decentralized structure otherwise.
Date/Time: December 17, 2025, 10:00 a.m.
Venue: Room 0218, Teaching Building 0, Jiuliu Campus
